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The article investigates how the Italian ex-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi produced a stereotypical 
view of Italy and the Italian national character to create shared background knowledge and con-
struct his audience as ideological subjects. Although his political campaigning focused on radical 
innovation, his rhetorical strategies, both verbal and nonverbal, reinforced traditional values and 
the myth of the nation by turning it into common sense. These strategies were particularly no-
ticeable in the speeches that he delivered in English to a lay audience, in which he frequently 
improvised and professional linguistic mediation was generally limited.  
The article presents the results of a pilot study that was conducted on two sample speeches 
that Renzi delivered in English at Georgetown University and Harvard. Based on the assumption 
that language expresses the system of values and beliefs of the speaker, the study applied Jeremy 
Munday’s model for evaluation in translation in order to foreground Renzi’s stance on the 
grounds of his discursive choices. Drawing upon Critical Discourse Analysis, Munday’s model 
was integrated with the analysis of implicit cognitive resources and culture-specific nonverbal 
language (hand gestures) in order to bring to the fore implied subtexts and, accordingly, the 
speaker’s axiological and ideological positioning. The article provides a brief overview of the 
relationship between discourse, power relations and identity, introduces the methodology 
adopted in research, provides an example of analysis and discusses the outcomes of research. 
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When Matteo Renzi was appointed in February 2014, he was the 
youngest Prime Minister in the history of the Italian Republic. In the first 
phases of his campaigning and institutional activity, his enthusiasm for 
innovation frequently took some radical overtones – so much so that he 







98; 2013: 6-7, 19; 2017: 56-59, 111]1. Although in his book of 2013, 
evocatively entitled Oltre la rottamazione (Beyond Demolition, my 
translation), he declared that this iconoclastic phase should leave room 
to a less radical evolution [2013: 3-33], the notions of change, dynamism, 
innovation and reforms would remain the leitmotifs of his political dis-
course in the years to come.  
Renzi’s iconoclastic communication, however, hid recurring refer-
ences to a stereotyped view of the national character and to conservative 
values. The clash between Renzi’s statement of intention and his com-
munication strategies was even more dramatic in the speeches he gave in 
a second language – which, to my best knowledge, was mainly English 
– to a lay audience. Whether Renzi frequently diverted from the written 
text that had presumably been prepared by his staff and improvised, or 
chose to give his speech without any translation support, his communi-
cation relied on verbal and nonverbal, implicit and explicit, strategies 
that promoted a view of a country deeply rooted in traditional, if not ste-
reotypical, values. 
The study discussed in this article originated precisely from acknowl-
edging this contrast in Renzi’s communication. In particular, it analysed 
the resources that contributed to reinforce this traditional view of the 
country, foregrounded the type of national character Renzi outlined in 
his speeches, analysed its function in discourse to shed light on his im-
plicit political message, and formulated hypotheses about the causes and 
purpose of these resources. 
The rationale for analysing stereotyping in Renzi’s speeches in Eng-
lish was manifold. On a theoretical level, I took on the assumption that 
meanings have a social effect and text analysis may shed light on the 
process of meaning-making (Fairclough [2003b: 11]). Moreover, as 
power is enacted in discourse, analysts should focus on systematic con-
tradictions and inconsistencies in institutional discourse in order to fore-
ground the real political persona behind the mask and expose possible 
manipulation and deception (Fairclough [2001: 239]; Wodak [2001: 4-
5; 2013: xx-xxiv]; Wodak and Meyer [2001/2009: 5]). Finally, the study 
 
1 The Italian term rottamatore, which literally means ‘car breaker’, has been trans-
lated both as ’scrapper’ and ’demolition man’ in the international media (see, for in-
stance, the Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/5fdb9710-940d-11e3-a0e1-
00144feab7de). I opt for ’demolition man’ instead of ‘scrapper’ because the latter may 
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filled a gap in existing research in intercultural communication in an in-
stitutional context, since, to my best knowledge, most research focuses 
on cultural mediation in relation to migration in a variety of forms, but 
little or no attention has been devoted so far to the way a leader’s identity 
is negotiated in (self)translation.  
On an analytical level, investigating whether Renzi the ‘demolition 
man’ contributed to reinforce stereotypes and clichés was of paramount 
importance to define what type of ‘articulation of political themes’ was 
being constructed in discourse (Fairclough [2000: 89]). This is because, 
far from being limited to political discourse, such articulation also in-
volved the dynamics of group formation and, consequently, national 
identity.  
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the notion stereotyping, I use ‘ste-
reotype’ as an umbrella term that includes a variety of allusions to con-
cepts and enactments of behaviours that are traditionally ascribed to the 
Italian national character. To identify the most common traits of Italian-
ness, I focused on some pivotal concepts that emerged from studies of 
Italian identity: the loyalty to one’s own community (municipalism and 
familism) and its daily, contemporary expression, namely the passion for 
football; the strong – at times even tyrannical – influence of the Catholic 
Church; the ability to develop duplicity and transformism to construct 
alliances as a defence against oppressive regimes; an almost obsessive 
pride for a past that is seen as glorious as opposed to a decaying present 
– whose backwardness seems to affect the South even more – and the 
consequent need for reformation; the rich artistic heritage that makes It-
aly one of the favourite tourist destinations worldwide; the extensive use 
of semiotic hand gestures, which form a culture-specific language of 
their own (Ginsborg [2001]; Patriarca [2010]). 
 
 
Discourse, power relations and identity  
 
The crucial assumption on which theories on the relationship between 
power and discourse are grounded is that all utterances are essentially 
dialogic. Language does not exist as a neutral medium, but becomes 
‘one’s own’ only when it is ‘appropriated’ by the listener (Bakhtin [1981: 
280, 282, 293-294]). If communication does not exist in a vacuum, dis-







Dijk [1997]). On the one hand, it is a ‘mode of action’ that shapes indi-
vidual identities and social relationships (Fairclough [1992: 63-66]). On 
the other, it depends on context, namely the mental model that deter-
mines how the participants in interaction define the communicative event 
(van Dijk [1997: 2; 2008]; Wodak [2013: xxxi-xxxii]; see also Chilton 
and Schäffner [2002: 26]; Goffman [1974/1986: 21-26, 563]). Context, 
moreover, is both subjective and socially-constructed, as it represents a 
personal interpretation of the situation, but is grounded on a variable 
amount of shared knowledge that is determined by social cognition (van 
Dijk [1997: 16-17; 2008: 63]).  
The implications of this assumption are very significant for research. 
First, discourse is essentially evaluative: «[n]o utterance can be put to-
gether without value judgment. Every utterance is above all an evaluative 
orientation. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has a 
meaning but also has a value» (Volosinov [1973: 105]). However, as 
evaluation depends not only on personal values but also on socially-de-
termined beliefs, ideology plays a crucial role in the production of mean-
ing: «[e]very sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation [...] 
the domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs [...]. Every-
thing ideological possesses semiotic value» (ibidem, 10). The evaluative 
nature of communication in relation to ideology makes the methodolog-
ical choice of the study all the more relevant, since it takes into account 
cognitive resources and presumptions in order to bring to the fore the 
evaluative stance and ideological sub-texts.  
Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is crucial to understand the 
complex dynamics that connect power, ideology, leadership and dis-
course. A concept that emerged in Lenin’s rhetoric, hegemony encom-
passes different aspects of life, from leadership to culture. Interestingly, 
it is not limited to coercion, but also relies on consensus through the in-
stitutions (Gramsci [1975: 1519; 2011]; Fairclough [1992: 9, 91-93; 
2001/2003a: 232; 1995/2013: 128]; Lo Piparo [2010: 25]). This notion 
is particularly relevant as it tightens the connection between power and 
discourse: «[h]egemony is leadership as well as domination across the 
economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. He-
gemony is the power over society as a whole […] [It] is about construct-
ing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate 
classes» (Fairclough [1995/2013: 61]). Hegemony, in other words, is the 
expression of a ruling elite that builds consensus and creates subjects by 
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This definition highlights three nodal points, namely elites, subjects 
and ideology. If the leader sets group beliefs and defines national identity 
by producing ideological representations of the world that serve the pur-
pose of creating homologised subjects (Laclau and Mouffe [1985/2001: 
85]), the process of creation of the subject is determined by ideology, 
which legitimises power by providing a «’representation’ of the imagi-
nary relationship of individuals […] to their real conditions of existence» 
(Jessop [2018: 37]). Elites, in short, legitimise their hegemonic power 
through systems of shared beliefs called ideologies (van Dijk 
[1998/2000: 48-49; 172-178]; Wodak [2001: 3]). 
Though there seems to be some disagreement among scholars on how 
pervasive and naturalised ideologies are, the relationship between ideol-
ogy (hegemony) and discourse is beyond doubt. First of all, language per 
se can be an instrument of hegemony as was the case, in Italy, of the 
debate over the choice of a national language and a normative written 
grammar (Rosiello [2010: 44]). Above all, discourse provides schemata 
for the interpretation of reality and, accordingly, reproduces ideologies 
(Hodge and Kress [1979: 5-6]). Since individuals communicate as group 
members, ideologies pervade information exchange as well as 
knowledge in general (van Dijk [1998/2000: 51; 1997: 31-32]): all the 
structures of discourse – from lexico-grammar to syntax, graphics, non-
verbal language, interaction and so on – can be instrumental to express 
implicit or explicit ideological beliefs (Fairclough [1998/2013: 101-
127]; Machin and Mayr [2012]; van Dijk [1998/2000: 200-210; 272-
273]). An exhaustive discussion on how these structures have been ana-
lysed to foreground underlying ideological assumptions would exceed 
the scope of this article. I shall, therefore, focus on one that is particularly 
significant for this study, namely Roland Barthes’ definition of myth, 
which is relevant to analyse how the representation of national identity 
works on an ideological level (Barthes [1972/2009: 131-187]; Hall 
[1997: 24-26]).  
According to Barthes, representation works through two semiotic sys-
tems, namely language (or any mode of representation) and myth, or 
metalanguage. The sign that results from the combination of a signifier 
and a signified in the linguistic process becomes the signifier, or mean-
ing, of myth, which Barthes calls form. As such, it is the product of a 
specific reading and, therefore, belongs to history. Once this meaning 







contingency, becomes abstract and gives birth to a new sign, or signifi-
cation (see figure below). 
 
By transcending history, myth naturalises reality. It «abolishes the 
complexity of human acts, […] it organizes a world which is without 
contradiction because it is without depth» (Barthes [1972/2009: 170]). 
Far from being arbitrary, myth responds to ideological necessity.  
The implications on analysis of Barthes’ system is manifold. First and 
foremost, it highlights the normalizing function of myths and their con-
sequent ideological motivation, which this study tackles by bringing to 
the fore implied meanings. Second, it underlines the significance of the 
cultural dimension of representations. Third, it provides a relevant con-
ceptual explanation for the notion of Italianness as a national stereotype: 
Barthes refers to Sininess or Sininity – the set of preconceived ideas on 
what being Chinese entails – as an example of neologism, whose purpose 
is to support myth-related concepts. By analogy, Italianness, like any 
other neologism referring to the (supposed) nature of national identity, 
belongs to the category of myths with an ideological purpose.  
The brief overview of the theories on how ideology is reproduced/en-
acted in discourse highlights the circularity of the relationship between 
social life and the representations – whether imaginary or real – brought 
forth by discourse. This is because representations are enacted in net-
works of social practices that generate (or belong to) discoursal or semi-
otic production (Fairclough [2001: 3; 1989/2015: 17]; Machin and Mayr 
[2012: 19]; van Dijk [2001: 114]; Wodak [2002: 149]; Wodak et al. 
 
 





THE MYTH OF THE NATION IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY 
465 
 
[1999/2009: 8]; see also the notion of ‘reflexivity’ in Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough [1999/2001: 26]). This circularity is all the more interesting 
when it reflects in personal identities, which are subject to representa-
tions that, in turn, they reproduce and reinforce as self-fulfilling prophe-
cies.  
On a theoretical level, Ernesto Laclau probably developed one of the 
most comprehensive theories on the dynamics of hegemonic power in 
relation to discourse. Laclau rejected Foucault’s distinction between dis-
cursive and non-discursive practices, since every object is an object of 
discourse (Laclau and Mouffe [1985/2001: 107-108]). Discourse, on the 
other hand, loses its mental character to become material, as it demon-
strated by the performative quality of language (ibidem). The conse-
quences of the breaking of the boundaries between discursive and non-
discursive are significant. Once again ideologies are far from being mere 
systems of concepts, since they are embodied in institutions and in the 
variety of forms of symbolic power (ibidem, 109). Moreover, social iden-
tities are defined as unfixed, since they exist in an unstable ‘system of 
differences’, a network of relations that never reach any point of stability 
(see van Dijk [1998/2000: 111-113; 2005: 31]; Wodak [2012: 216]). The 
reason behind the unfixity of social categories is their nature of ‘floating 
signifiers’ – elements that cannot reach stability due to the proliferation 
of signifieds (polysemy) – and it is this very emptiness that hegemony 
tries (temporarily) to fill in (Laclau and Mouffe [1985/2001: 88, 113]; 
Laclau [2005: 116, 171; 2007: 43]).  
From the standpoint of research, this assumption foregrounds three 
relevant implications. First, the floating nature of categories as empty 
signifiers at the centre of hegemonic struggles makes the role of language 
essential in the tension of society towards stability. Second, institutions 
and institutional figures are pivotal in spreading ideologies and, in a so-
ciety that can never reach its full expression, their role is never accom-
plished. Analysing institutional discourse, therefore, is even more crucial 
in foregrounding ideological meaning-making. Finally, since identity 
formation is an ongoing process at the centre of (discursive) relational 
tensions, possible issues and hindrances arising in the process of negoti-
ating identity in intercultural discourse are pivotal, especially on an in-
stitutional level. 
In other words, the use of specific resources, does not only bear sig-
nificant consequences in terms of how the message is decoded, but also 







and ideologically constructed (Davies and Harré [1990]; Hall [1996a: 4]; 
Wodak et al. [2009: 14-15]), it can also be considered a choice among 
different narratives (Somers [1994: 614]; Wodak [2012: 216]). This im-
plies that the consequences of Renzi’s choices in his capacity as Prime 
Minister were significant and far from neutral: according to the dynamics 
of group formation, he acted as a prototype and his identity was particu-
larly influential for ingroup members to identify with (Hogg and Abrams 





Since the study focused on possible contradictions between the ex-
Premier’s message of innovation and dynamism and the implied mean-
ing of his verbal and nonverbal messages, the analysis of the resources 
he used to presuppose shared background knowledge was crucial. More 
specifically, six categories were considered pivotal in research: past-fu-
ture oppositions, the inclusive pronoun we, stereotypes about Italy, Ital-
ian words or ‘Italianised’ English (calques), jokes and nonverbal com-
munication (semiotic hand gestures). These categories were chosen both 
because of their relevance and the frequency with which they occurred. 
Past-future oppositions represented the frame of most of Renzi’s com-
munication and were associated with clear-cut evaluative judgments on 
his part. The inclusive pronoun we is generally one of the most frequent 
rhetoric tools to create shared background knowledge. Stereotypes about 
Italy were the main focus of research. Jokes and playful remarks aimed 
to win the approval of the audience and recalled the Italian tradition of 
friendliness and clientelism, thus representing a form of implicit cultural 
stereotype. Finally, gestures possessed an intrinsic cultural value, since 
«one of the most basic and obvious functions of nonverbal communica-
tion is to communicate one’s culture» (Andersen [1999: 75]); all the 
more so in the case of Italy, where emblems (independent semiotic hand 
gestures; Ekman and Friesen [1969]) represent a real language of its own 
and are, therefore, culture-specific.  
The study adopted Jeremy Munday’s model for evaluation in transla-
tion (2012) to analyse two official videos of Renzi’s speeches in English, 
which he addressed to a general audience at Georgetown University in 
2015 and Harvard in 2016. By combining James R. Martin and Peter 
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Theory (2004), Munday’s framework highlights the strategies of evalua-
tion and self-positioning of the speaker. Besides the set of linguistic 
structures, the speaker is also offered the choice among a variety of per-
sonal values and social beliefs embedded in axiology and ideology: it is 
this stratification of knowledge and implied meanings permeating the 
message that this study foregrounded. 
Following Appraisal Theory, Renzi’s rhetorical resources were ana-
lysed in terms of engagement, attitude and graduation, where engage-
ment and attitude represent, respectively, the stance of the speaker to-
wards external voices and the speaker’s feelings, whereas graduation ex-
presses the degree of intensity of both engagement and attitude. Attitude 
can be expressed towards feelings and emotions (affect), or ethics, be-
haviour and capacity (judgement), or things and phenomena (apprecia-
tion). The speaker may dismiss different viewpoints (monoglossia) or 
acknowledge them by showing a variable degree of tolerance (hetero-
glossia). These categories are further divided into a system of specific 
sub-categories that account for a variety of implicit and explicit rhetori-
cal modulations.  
On the other hand, Chilton’s Deictic Space Theory was used to fore-
ground Renzi’s position with reference to time, space and modality 
(namely, the axiology and ideology of the speaker). Deictic positioning 
is graphically represented as the intersection of three vectors along which 
the main semantic resources employed are placed according to their dis-
tance from the centre/speaker (deictic centre). The far end of the modal-
ity axis is the location of the ‘Other’ (see example below). 
Since implicit cognitive resources were crucial to understand Renzi’s 
strategies to construct a shared background, the study tested whether 
Munday’s model provided a viable method to account for their presence 
both in verbal and nonverbal language. In particular, the framework was 
applied to second-language production instead of inter-language transla-
tions. Moreover, explicit and implicit stereotypes, calques, jokes, dexis 
and semiotic hand gestures were analysed simultaneously with textual 
resources. Semiotic hand gestures, in particular, were pivotal in the anal-
ysis of Renzi’s rhetoric both as indexical of the Italian stereotype and as 
a significant visual component of analysis, thus contributing to yet an-
other innovative feature, multimodality. Finally, the two models were 
completely integrated since the data from appraisal analysis were used 







contributed to interpretation (for a full discussion of the methodology see 
Reggi [2019]). 
Overall, the study drew upon Critical Discourse Analysis, or CDA, 
insofar as it took on the assumption that discourse is a social phenome-
non embodying power relations, originates from a discourse-related 
problem, is multidisciplinary, has linguistic analysis as its main core and 
reflects on the analysis itself (Chouliaraki and Fairclough [1999/2001: 
60-68; 2003b: 209-210]).  
 
 
Example of analysis 
 
Extract from the speech at Georgetown University:  
 
I believe the future, in Italy, is more interesting than the past. Oh, I know eh? I know 
very well the incredible past of my country. Italy is rich with beauty art, food... [...] 
So... we... we know the past in Italy is beautiful. Buzzfeed gave 39 reason last week not 
to visit Italy: Dolomiti, Val D’Orcia, wine, Sardinia sea, and we can continue. We have 
an unique art heritage and more than half the Unesco global heritage are in our country. 
Italy is a land of science, of experiments, of innovation. Of course you might think they 
used to have Leonardo da Vinci now there is Matteo Renzi, this is a really problem for 
the decline... symbol of decline of Italy. [...] Italy for the moment, in the last 20 years, 
in particularly in the last 20 years Italy seems a sleeping beauty. Politics, government, 
what you call in Washington DC ‘beltway’ got stuck. The world changed around us 

































The study highlighted that the references to Italianness that Renzi 
used in his rhetoric in English were multifarious and complex: they 
ranged from stereotypes to quotations, involved verbal and nonverbal re-
sources alike and were both implicit and explicit. Overall, they (re)pro-
duced a stereotypical view of the country that stood in dramatic contrast 
with Renzi’s change-oriented political programme. The study showed 
that, though Renzi apparently celebrated innovation and invoked a future 
of radical change, he constantly reaffirmed and reproduced the status quo 
by means of two main strategies: stereotyping and referencing. Below I 
shall explore how these resources appealed to specific ideologies to cre-
ate meaning. 
Renzi referred to the stereotypes of the Italian character by either 
quoting or enacting them in a variety of ways. On the one hand, he nat-
uralised some clichés, both explicitly and implicitly, by quoting them as 
a matter of fact by means of monoglossic structures: «Italy is rich with 
beauty art, food [...] We have an unique art heritage and more than half 







Food? Lifestyle? Holidays?»; «Italy is a bridge, natural bridge in the re-
lation between Europe and Africa»; «I’m Italian, I speak a lot». Surpris-
ingly, he found himself in the paradoxical situation of mentioning such 
clichés even when his interlocutor, Jeff Immelt, contradicted him and 
mentioned engineering as a different, more modern interpretation of Ital-
ian primacy. When narrating the episode at Georgetown University, 
Renzi not only expressed a commonplace view of the country he offi-
cially represented during his conversation with Immelt, but he also rein-
forced his own opinion by adding an overtone of surprise. 
On the other hand, Renzi frequently enacted some specific behaviours 
that constructed a stereotypical ingroup prototype. To begin with, he fre-
quently showed a significant degree of municipalism by referring to his 
hometown, Florence, even when it was not strictly relevant. He both 
mentioned his experience as a mayor and did not miss any opportunity 
to refer to Florence in a variety of ways, both explicitly and implicitly. 
He mentioned his passion for football and his being a fan of the team of 
his hometown; chose Leonardo da Vinci as an example of the Italian 
‘genius’; joked about the name ‘Villa Firenze’ and Amerigo Vespucci; 
quoted Florence and the Renaissance as an ideal balance of artistic and 
financial development, and so on. Another element that outlined Renzi’s 
institutional persona as stereotypical is his own Catholic heritage. 
Though he did not mention the Church very often, his Catholic upbring-
ing is quite significantly summed up in his warm appreciation of the Jes-
uit tradition of Georgetown University, which, significantly, place him 
in a fully conservative position2.  
Also the high frequency of witty remarks and jokes in his rhetoric is 
quite indicative. Since they were recurrent in both speeches, but in-
creased whenever the interactions became more spontaneous and were 
sometimes unsuccessful due to improvisation or misunderstanding, they 
seemed to be born of the speaker’s urge to please the audience rather 
than being simply a rhetoric device. Finally, the stereotype of Italianness 
is significantly embedded in Renzi’s extensive – and often very complex 
– use of Italian semiotic hand gestures, accompanied by calques and in-
terferences of the Italian language.  
 
2 The religious order of the Jesuits has long been deemed responsible for the stag-
nation and the decadence of Italy during the Counter-Reformation (Barzini [1964/1996: 
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The second strategy consisted in recalling (both implicitly and explic-
itly) mainstream theories dating back to the 19th and early 20th century. 
These references are pivotal to understand Renzi’s political discourse as 
they involved his programme of innovation, showed a complex interplay 
of opposing influences and provided an explanation to his contradictory 
attitude towards the past.  
First, the main themes and tones of Renzi’s programme remind of the 
iconoclastic rhetoric of the first decades of the 20th century. His enthusi-
asm for technological innovations, radical change, youth, dynamism and 
speed recall the violently radical programme of the Futurist movement 
(Barile [2014a: 36; 2014b: 7-8]); so much so that his use of the term 
‘demolition’ was directly associated to Fascist rhetoric by an official 
voice of the former Communist Party3. Overall, Renzi’s iconoclastic 
claim to modernity, his celebration of youth and dynamism, his urge to 
renovate Italy and build the new Italians by reviving past glories, his pas-
sion for modern media, his use of everyday language and appeal to emo-
tions, have their legacy in the performative politics of right wing move-
ments and in Benito Mussolini’s communication style (Corner-Pels 
[2003: 8-9]; Falasca-Zamponi [2000]). Renzi himself implicitly testified 
to this legacy when he expressed his contempt for the passive, past-ori-
ented attitude of the Italians.    
Second, both Renzi’s positivistic optimism for the future and his ob-
session with backwardness and regeneration were heir to a debate that 
involved intellectuals and politicians for centuries. Whereas his defini-
tion of the country as a ‘sleeping beauty’  recalls similar comments by 
writer Madame de Staël and poet Alphonse De Lamartine (Patriarca 
[2010: 27]; De Lamartine [1825: 62-63]4), the solutions he proposed 
evoke the reformation programmes of the Father Founders. Thus, Renzi 
echoed Benedetto Croce, Vincenzo Gioberti and Giuseppe Mazzini, to 
name only a few, in his attempt to propose a ‘Mediterranean way’ to 
regenerate Italy as opposed to the model of Northern Europe. He sug-
gested that such a solution would be grounded on the presumed primacy 
of the country as the cradle of civilisation due to its position in the Med-
iterranean and its humanistic legacy – supposedly rich in beauty, emo-
 
3 Prospero, M. ‘Pd: rottamazione, idea fascistoide’, l'Unita, 16 October 2012. 
4 «[T]out dort,/Tout, jusqu'aux souvenirs de ton antique histoire./Qui te feraient du 







tions and ethical values – which would lead to a new Renaissance. More-
over, his reference to Florence as the most successful example of inno-
vation and culture in Italy exceeded the boundaries of localism to recall 
those intellectuals – among them, Gioberti and Alessandro Manzoni – 
who advocated the supremacy of the Florentine culture and literature in 
the debate on the national language of the newly born Kingdom of Italy 
(Marazzini [1999]).  
More importantly, Renzi’s faith in progress and the positive develop-
ment of history dates back to the age of European imperialism and are 
grounded on modern idealism – which saw in Croce its most important 
Italian representative – and its aim to reform society through ‘struggle, 
commitment and mediation’ (Bauman and Bordoni [2014: 80, 122]). It 
is worth noting, however, that Renzi’s version of idealism was highly 
inconsistent. While embracing the rational, solidarity-oriented collectiv-
ism of the Hegelian school, he also embodied postmodern irrational sub-
jectivism by celebrating innovation for innovation’s sake, flexibility and 
change and behaving as an individualistic, post-ideological politician (on 
the contrasting dynamics of modernity and postmodernity, see Bauman 
and Bordoni [2014: 80-84, 113-128]). 
It has been pointed out that some of the ambivalence embedded in 
Renzi’s rhetoric was an expression of his composite personality and his 
intention to appeal to the electorate of the left and the right alike by draw-
ing on the style and programme of the New Labour to develop his own 
‘Third Way’ (Barile [2014a: 14, 18, 58-62]). According to this interpre-
tation, Renzi’s praise for dynamism was a way to make Italians more 
cosmopolitan (Barile [2014b: 8]), while appealing also to a more con-
servative electorate by displaying the everyday communication style of 
the ‘person next door’, based on emotions and storytelling (ibidem, 58, 
88-94, 117, 132). In other words, Blair’s carefully-constructed ‘normal-
ness’ (Fairclough [2000: 97-100]) was transformed by Renzi into Ital-
ianness. Therefore, Renzi’s frequent references to his experience as a 
mayor, his limited command of the English language and his markedly 
Italian accent were instrumental to connect to his audience (as much as 
his Florentine accent to connect to his Italian electorate), since he be-
haved as first among equals and embodied the traits of the Italians (Barile 
[2014a: 58]; Galimberti [2015: 40]), like Berlusconi did with their vices 
(Savio [2014: 317]).  
I only partially agree on explaining the inconsistencies in Renzi’s 
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behaviours and beliefs. It was indeed my intention to go beyond this in-
terpretation and attempt deeper understanding of political and ideologi-
cal implications in the in-depth linguistic and multimodal analysis dis-
cussed in this study. First, as I have already pointed out, the Italian legacy 
of this communication style dates back to the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury within right-wing movements. When Renzi gained his position at 
centre stage in contemporary political arena, these techniques had largely 
been exploited by centre-right parties (Loporcaro [2004: 95]), whereas 
the left still preferred a more traditional approach. Indeed, it was Silvio 
Berlusconi who introduced the innovations that Renzi would follow and 
develop in the years to come. Moreover, celebrations of local identity 
such as municipalism did not belong to Italian left-wing discourse, which 
heavily contested it as a potential source of sectarian interests (Pratt 
[2001: 90]). Finally, Renzi’s almost obsessive reference to stereotypes 
and the traditional Italian culture largely exceeded the boundaries of in-
formal style to embrace the century-long attempts to forge the Italian 
national character.  
 
 
Italianness and the myth of the nation 
 
Renzi’s rhetorical strategies bore a significant ideological conse-
quence for two reasons. On the one hand, identity is a choice and is con-
structed in discourse. On the other, ideology plays a crucial role in keep-
ing stereotypes (and group membership) stable. Whether spontaneous or 
carefully staged or the interplay of both dynamics, Renzi’s identity fore-
grounded illusory dynamism and modernity while perpetuating the 
founding elements of Catholic political tradition. This is because Renzi 
produced precise ideological representations, or slogan-images (Simons 
[2000: 96]), of Italy and the Italian character that sounded innovative and 
change-oriented while, at the same time, being reassuringly familiar. To 
do so he made extensive use of two main strategies of political commu-
nication, legitimisation and coercion, namely the forms of ‘soft power’ 
(Nye [1990]).  
Renzi realised his own form of soft power by constructing a political 
persona that embodied stereotypes and reproduced clichés. On the one 
hand, his rhetoric devices, from culturally-loaded emblems to calques, 
jokes and his limited command of English converged into the creation of 







authoritative pitch and volume of his voice underlined his leadership role 
and contributed to make his figure prototypical. Significantly, in the 
speeches analysed in this study Renzi used the explicit locution ‘I am’ 
only to define himself either as a leader or a typical Italian. The function 
of Renzi’s Italianness, therefore, was twofold: it overtly defined his own 
identity, but implicitly determined the characteristics of group member-
ship and set its goals, values and beliefs.  
While reproducing the prototype of the Italian citizen, Renzi also re-
produced the myth of the nation. He constructed, in Anderson’s terms, 
an ‘imagined community’ [2006] with a mythical past and a mythical 
geographic space. Indeed, the symbols and traditions that have been cre-
ated to consolidate modern nations are largely based on the reinvention 
of the past (Billig [1995: 38]; Bell [2003]; De Cillia et al. [1999: 150, 
154-155]; Kedourie [1993: 70-82]; Smith [1991/1993: 140, 161]; Wodak 
et al. [2009: 25]). Together with a geographical territory with an ideal-
ised landscape and borders to be defended, history is, therefore, the main 
pillar of nationalism (Bell [2003: 76]; Billig [1995: 74-78]; Smith, 
[1991/1993: 14, 69, 117]). Indeed, the ultimate purpose of representa-
tions is to build a sense of belonging to a common ground, and one of 
the most effective ways is manipulating collective memory. 
 
Memory is a concept that is readily employed to represent a whole host of different 
social practices, cognitive processes and representational strategies and what gets sub-
merged, flattened out, is the nuance, texture and often-contradictory forces and tensions 
of history and politics. In particular it can elide the manner in which such ‘memories’ 
are constructed through acts of manipulation, through the atavistic play of power (Bell 
[2003: 71]).  
 
The community that Renzi built gathered around the inclusive pro-
noun ‘we’ that he frequently used, very relevantly, when discussing 
about shared values and the Italian cultural and artistic heritage. To de-
fine the geographic space of the community he recalled traditional cli-
chés, 19th century reform programmes and an ethical vocation by refer-
ring to a «boot», a «bridge between different cultures», «a natural bridge 
in the relation between Europe and Africa», and to the Mediterranean as 
the «connection between our roots and our future […] the custodian of 
our memory». Similarly, he reinvented a mythical past to be revived by 
celebrating the Florentine Renaissance and praising humanistic culture 
and emotions. Community, geographic space and history, therefore, 
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Renzi chose to frame his myth of the nation, a myth that he summed up 
in the slogan «[i]f the world asks […] beauty... ask the... connection, ask 
dignity, ask values, this world asks Italy». 
Though inclusive, myths naturalise reality. They erase complexity 
and represent reality as uncontested and uncontroversial (Baker [2006: 
3, 8-11]; Bell [2003: 75]). In other words, they offer the «symbolic gen-
eralization» that reduces complexity and makes explicit communication 
largely redundant (Luhman [1979: 130]). Myths, therefore, are «uni-vo-
cal» narrations (Bell [2003: 75]) and can be constructed only by exclud-
ing dialogic voices.  All forms of fellowship, community and solidarity 
depend upon meanings which are shared and can be taken as given, and 
no form of social communication or interaction is conceivable without 
some such ‘common ground’. On the other hand, the capacity to exercise 
social power, domination and hegemony includes the capacity to shape 
to some significant degree the nature and content of this ‘common 
ground’, which makes implicitness and assumptions an important issue 
with respect to ideology (Fairclough [2003b: 55]). 
If Blair extensively made categorical statements to claim moral au-
thority and toughness (Fairclough [1995/2013: 388-389]), Renzi used 
monoglossia and presumptions as a significant instrument in the process 
of myth-making to naturalise representations by excluding alternative 
voices (Fairclough [2003b: 42-47]). It is worth noting that humorous re-
marks and nonverbal language also played a pivotal role in this mythical 
narration. Gestures, in particular, largely contributed to making commu-
nication more immediate since they are spontaneous, appeal to emotions, 
and (re)produce and naturalise shared culture.  
Whereas the frequent and extensive use of these techniques was in-
strumental to engaging with the audience, they were also crucial in cre-
ating the necessary trust to ensure that the myth of the nation got across. 
Trust is indeed a pivotal notion in Renzi’s rhetoric. It needs a familiar 
world that builds upon a simplified vision of history in order to define 
(and present) a reassuring, uncomplicated version of the future (Luhman 
[1979: 20]). It is through trust, therefore, that Renzi naturalised a famil-
iar, selectively appropriated, version of the past to pave the way to a pos-
itive, simplified future. Thus, the many inconsistencies and contradic-










Since not only did Renzi quoted clichés, but he also embodied them,  
his political persona emerged as culturally-loaded, even provincial, as 
testified to by the incidents of miscommunication that occurred during 
his speeches. Such a specific choice had very significant consequences 
on the values and beliefs that Renzi promoted, which were the ultimate 
focus of this study. Indeed, all the strategies discussed above are far from 
being ideologically neutral. A ‘mediatised’ politician who inherited the 
communication style of media tycoon Berlusconi, he drew inspiration 
from pop culture and the show business and adopted their techniques 
based on conversationalism, sociability, emotions, irrationality, casual-
ness and friendliness (Barile [2014a]; Corner-Pels [2003]; Higgins 
[2018]; Street [2001, 2003, 2004]). His rhetoric was heir to this ‘picto-
rial’ tradition and privileged visual resources (gestures and facial expres-
sions) to data, and emotions to information. Though he insisted on the 
role of education and culture, the putative audience of his talks was noth-
ing more than the passive public of a show. 
Renzi, therefore, emerged contradictorily as a post-ideological politi-
cian that acted as an ideologised politician. The ambivalence depends on 
the two parallel planes along which Renzi’s communication unfolded: 
the explicit celebration of innovation and modernity, which Renzi broad-
cast as an entertainer, and the implicit consolidation of a traditional form 
of nationalism, grounded on Catholicism, which he partly enacted and 
partly expressed through the discursive strategies described in the previ-
ous sections. 
Hypotheses on the ultimate functions of such strategies would largely 
exceed the scope of this study. Instead I shall make some final observa-
tions on the dynamics of nationalism. The modern notion of nation-state 
is based on the need for citizens to share the same loyalties and values 
(Gellner [1997/1998: 7]). This social identity is so well-established that 
not only does the loyalty towards the ingroup become primary, but it 
even substitutes any other (Hobsbawm [1972: 388]). Cultural homoge-
nisation, however, should not be conceived as fixed and stable, but a pro-
cess that involves struggle and tension (Hall [1996b: 617]). This is be-
cause individual identity is not univocal or stable in time, but is a work 
in progress, since it is composed of numerous identifications that indi-
viduals may change during their lives (De Cillia [1999: 154]; Wodak, 




THE MYTH OF THE NATION IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY 
479 
 
strife of competing narrations, which struggle for hegemony over alter-
native voices by producing and re-producing representations of the world 
(Bell [2003: 75]; Billig [1995: 38-39]; Lippmann [1922/1998: 238-239]). 
Within the context of contemporary politics Renzi’s rhetoric seemed 
to respond to the current ‘state of crisis’ (Bauman and Bordoni [2014]) 
almost to perfection, at least theoretically. Selective remembering – and, 
consequently, selective forgetting – is not limited to tyrannical regimes, 
but is widely practised by democracies to exert control over their elec-
torate. Given the present condition of paralysis due to the separation of 
politics and power (ibidem, 12), the only response lies in the manipula-
tion of collective memory (ibidem, 61), in the nostalgic recreation of that 
mythical ‘elsewhere’ that Zygmunt Bauman calls «retrotopia» [2017: 3-
5]. Indeed, far from reviving the past in the present or making it a viable 
solution to current problems, myth lives outside history, as already en-
visaged by Barthes. Renzi’s version of the so-called ‘civic nationalism’ 
(Chouliaraki [2000]) – naturalised as a dominant ideology by a long tra-
dition – provided the electorate with something with which they had been 
familiar for centuries: a reassuring, simplified representation of a myth-
ical dimension that promised to pave the way to a likewise mythical fu-
ture. 
However, though Renzi’s strategies were successful in ensuring a 
large consensus until 2015, they could not prevent its dramatic downfall, 
which led to the poor result of the Democratic Party in the general elec-
tion of March 2018 and the consequent rise of a right-wing coalition. A 
possible explanation may lie in that he recurred to traditional ideology to 
meet the demands of a disoriented, post-ideological electorate. Renzi 
chose to fill the signifiers that had been left empty by contemporary heg-
emonic struggle with traditional meanings instead of taking on a hege-
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